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PRESENT-DAY RELEVANCE
OF THE JAY TREATY ARBITRATIONS
Georg Schwarzenberger*
The Arbitrations under the Jay Treaty of November 19, 1794 are commonly
treated as the starting point of present-day international adjudication.
Perhaps in response to written and oral pleadings before the International
Court of Justice1 in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case (1950), Judge Read
referred to international arbitration "as it 'has been developed since the Jay
Treaty of 1794." More particularly, he traced from this date the origin of good
faith as a factor in the evolution of international adjudication.2
Judge Read's W. M. Martin Lectures on The Rule of Law on the Inter-
national Plane, given at Saskatchewan University in 1960, explain why Judge
Read treated the Jay Treaty Arbitrations as the dawn of contemporary inter-
national arbitration: "It takes one bold act to transform the unthinkable into the
thinkable, and a second or third to make it a normal course.... The Jay Treaty
* . .was three bold steps in one, sufficient to transfer the unthinkable into the
normal.... While Grotius was the father of international law, John Jay, who
incorporated the arbitral provisions into the Treaty which bears his name, was
the legitimate parent of international justice, and is entitled to a place of honour
on the march towards the rule of law on the international plane."'
Similarly, in his Presidential Address at the special Commemoration Sitting
of the International Court of Justice in 1972, Judge Sir Muhammad Zafrulla
Khan praised the Jay Treaty as the "historical landmark from which the trend
which was to lead to the establishment of a true international judicial system is
usually dated."4
I. The Jay Treaty Tradition
Judge Read's and President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan's evaluations of
the Jay Treaty and the work of the three Commissions under the Treaty form
part of a strong tradition in the Doctrine of International Law dating back to the
end of the last century.'
A. Contents
This tradition is concerned with the contributions made by the Jay Treaty
and the Arbitrations under the Treaty to International Judicial Law, rather than
* Of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Director, London Institute of World Affairs; Emeritus
Professor of International Law in the University of London.
1 Written Statement by the U.S.A. Government (Pleadings at 234) and Oral Statement
by Mr. Fitzmaurice at the Court's public sitting of March 2, 1950 (Pleadings at 322-23).
2 [1950] I.C.J. REP. 242. See also id. at 61 (D.O., Judge Sir Arnold McNair).
3 THE RULE OF LAW 11 (1961).
4 [1970-1971] INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE YEARBOOK 130 [hereinafter cited as
I. C. J. Y. B.].
5 See Schlochauer, Die Entwicklung der internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, in 10
ARCHIv DES VOELKERREGHTS 8 n.44, nn.4-7. See also id. at 9. This is also the starting
point of A. STUYT, SuRvEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS (1972).
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the substantive aspects of international law covered by the Awards.6
In this view, 1794 is the landmark which neatly divides "les anciens
errements des pratiques modernes"7 : it was then established that international
judicial organs were entitled to vote by majority, determine their own jurisdic-
tion, and settle international disputes on the basis of international law. The year
1794 was the first of the landmarks on mankind's march towards-in Judge
Read's words-"the rule of law on the international plane."8
Each of these claims will have to be more closely examined: the institutional
character of the Jay Treaty Commissions, the degree of integration attained by
the Commissions, and their judicial character.
B. Origins
The origins of the tradition can be dated with relative accuracy.
Wheaton's History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America from the
Earliest Times to the Treaty of Washington, 1842 (1845) contained only brief
references to provisions in the Jay Treaty on substantive international law.9 In
Wheaton's Elements of International Law (ed. R. H. Dana-1866) and
Woolsey's Introduction to the Study of International Law (1875) the Jay
Treaty was altogether ignored. In Wharton's Digest of International Law of the
United States (3 vols.-1886) the Jay Treaty and the Commissions were men-
tioned in only a perfunctory way.1"
Similarly, in the major British works of the period-Phillimore's Com-
mentaries upon International Law (4 vols.-1 879-89) 11 and Lorimer's Institutes
of the Law of Nations (2 vols.-1883/4) ,12 the Jay Treaty but not the Arbitra-
tions received passing notice, and neither was recognized in Travers Twiss, The
Law of Nations (2 vols.-1875-1884).
The turning point came in 1898. A considerable part of the relevant
material was made readily available in J. B. Moore's History and Digest of the
International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, published
in six volumes by the United States Government Printing Office.' 3 Moreover,
6 On the various aspects of substantive international law considered in the Jay Treaty
Arbitrations, see I G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNA-
TIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 64 et seq. (1957), and vol. II at 31, 564, 577-78, 596, 620,
646-47, (1968).
7 LaPradelle-Politis, The bad old ways from modern practices 1 RECUEIL DES ARBITRA-
TIONS INTERNATIONALES XXiX (rev. ed. 1932). See also C. E. HILL, LEADING AMERICAN
TREATIES 365 (1922); P. CORBETT, LAW IN DIPLOMACY 139 et seq. (1959) Lillich, The Jay
Treaty Commissions, 37 ST. JOHN'S L. R. 260 (1963).
8 See note 3 supra.
9 Id. at 379, 388.
10 Paras. 150a, 221, 316.
11 Vol. III (1885) at 345.
12 Vol. II at 556. The Jay Treaty and Arbitrations are not mentioned at all in H. MAINE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1915); A. RIVIER, LEHRBUCH DES VOELKERRECHTS (1889); and
F. VON MARTENS, VOELKERRECHT (German trans. from Russian, 1883-86).
13 Hereinafter cited as MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS. See also the subsequent
edition of MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS, ANCIENT AND MODERN (Modern Series),
6 vols. (1929-33) [hereinafter cited as MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS].
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soon after, in Recueil des Arbitrages Internationales (1905), de LaPradelle and
Politis published lengthy extracts in French from Moore with elaborate com-
ments of their own. They claimed considerably more for the Jay Treaty and
Arbitrations than Moore had. What, to Moore, was an obvious starting point
because the Jay Treaty Arbitrations were the first international arbitrations in
which his country was involved, became to de LaPradelle and Politis the com-
mencement of a new epoch.14 A reformist movement of growing impetus, and
composed of many strands, had found a plausible pedigree for its evolutionary
ideology. John Jay's use, with full British support, of the device of arbitration
was upgraded to a deed of "world historic merit."1 5
II. The Institutional Character
of the Jay Treaty Commissions
Two aspects of the Jay Treaty Commissions determine their institutional
character: their constitution as organic units and the intended, and actual,
freedom of their members from governmental instructions.
A. Organic Character
In relation to the Commissions under Articles VI (pre-peace claims of
British subjects against United States citizens and inhabitants) and VII (illegal
seizures of. United States ships and property during the then pending war of
France against Great Britain and her Continental Allies) of the Jay Treaty, it
is expressly stated that three of the Commissioners shall constitute a "board, and
shall have power to do any act appertaining to the said Commission." The only
proviso is that one of the Commissioners named by each Contracting Party
(original Commissioners) and the fifth Commissioner (chosen by the original
Commissioners or by lot) should be present. 6
Article V (identity of the River St. Croix) does not contain any correspond-
ing provision. The reason is that the Commission under this Article consisted of
only three Commissioners, and they together were charged with drawing up and
signing a joint declaration which was to embody their findings.' Thus, the
Contracting Parties had expressed in different form their common intent that,
once the two original Commissioners had chosen the third Commissioner, the
Commission should function with its full complement of all three Commissioners.
B. Freedom from Instructions
Articles V-VII of the Jay Treaty do not contain any express reference to
14 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
15 H. LAMMAScH, DIE LEHRE VON DER SCHIEDSGERIGHTSBARKEIT IN IHREM GANZEN
UMFANG30 (1914).
16 MARTENS, RECUEIL I 350, 354 (Supp. 1800) and H. MILLER TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 245 (1931). For the reasons why
there is no signed original of the Treaty in the United States Department of State, see MILLER
at 267.
17 See 6 MARTENS, supra note 16, at 346.
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freedom of the Commissioners from instructions. Yet, in at least three spheres,
it would have been contrary to the common intent of the Parties to issue in-
structions to their original commissioners, not to speak of those selected-without
this being stated in so many words-as umpires:
1. Instructions in Bad Faith
The Treaty was to be executed and observed with "punctuality and the
most sincere regard to good faith.""8 To instruct any of the Commissioners to
withdraw from the Commission so as to make it inoperative (or not to replace
Commissioners who, on their own initiative, acted in bad faith) would have
been incompatible with the jus aequum nexus of the Treaty. 9
To allow the original United States Commissioners to withdraw from Com-
mission VI without instructing them to resume their duties, and if they refused,
to replace them, could be considered-as Great Britain so characterized it-as
a breach of the Treaty by the United States. This, in turn, entitled the British
Government, at least in its own view of the matter, to withdraw by way of re-
prisal its own original Commissioners from Commission VII." In the end, the
matter was cleared up by inter-governmental negotiation and the conclusion of
a further Convention on January 8, 1802. Accordingly, the United States made
an agreed lump sum payment regarding the British claims under Article VI, and
the Commission under Article VI was wound up. After two and a half years'
interruption of the work of the Commission under Article VII, the British Gov-
ernment asked the British members to resume their duties"' and, in 1804, the
Commission completed its work.
2. Instructions Conflicting with the Oaths and Declarations Prescribed
in the Treaty for the Commissioners
The Commissioners under Article V had to swear to examine and decide
"impartially" the matters entrusted to them on the basis of the evidence laid
before the Commission." More elaborately, the Commissioners under Article
VI were to swear or affirm that they would "honestly, diligently, impartially and
carefully" examine all claims before them." Similarly, the Commissioners under
Article VII were to decide the cases submitted to them according to their merits.'
3. Instructions Incompatible with the Rules Prescribed in the Treaty
for the Settlement of Disputes
The character of these rules will be examined in a subsequent Section."
18 6 MARTENS, supra note 16, at 384.
19 See also I-III SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 6, at index under Jus aequum.
20 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 337-38.
21 Id. at 339.
22 6 MARTENS, supra note 16, at 346.
23 Id. at 350.
24 Id. at 354.
25 See Section 5 infra.
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Yet, irrespective of this, to interfere with the Commissioners' right and duty to
apply the rules prescribed by the Treaty would have constituted a breach of
treaty no less than instructions incompatible with the oaths or declarations of the
Commissioners.
With the exception of the retaliatory instructions issued by the British
Government to the British members of the Commission under Article VII, the
instructions known to have been issued to members of the Commissions all served
the purpose of implementing the common intent of the Parties to "terminate their
differences"" and to facilitate the Commissions' work.
III. The Degree of Integration Attained
by the Jay Treaty Commissions
To measure the degree of integration or institutional cohesion attained by
the Jay Treaty Commissions, two tests appear to be helpful: the voting rules
provided and the Commissions' attitudes to self-determination of their own
jurisdiction.
A. Voting Rules
It is advisable to distinguish between the measures to be taken by the
original members, nominated by each Party for purposes of completing each of
the three Commissions by selecting the third Commissioner (under Article V)
and the fifth Commissioner (under Articles VI and VII), and subsequent
decisions to be made by any of the completed Commissions.
Under Article V of the Jay Treaty, each Party was to name a Commis-
sioner, and the two Commissioners named were to agree on the choice of a
third. If they failed to do so, each was to propose one name, and one of these
was to be drawn by lot in their presence.28
Under Articles VI and VII of the Treaty, two Commissioners were to be
appointed by each side, and the fifth by the "unanimous voice" of the other four.
In case of disagreement, the fifth Commissioner was to be drawn by lot in a pro-
cedure adapted from Article V."
Voting rules for the completed Commissions under Articles VI and VII
were expressly prescribed by the Treaty. A board of three members, consisting of
one of the original Commissioners on each side and the fifth member, was entitled
to make any decision by majority vote. 0
In contrast, Article V remained silent on voting rules. From this it could
be inferred that, because the final Declaration on the identity of the River St.
Croix was to be under the hands and seals of all three Commissioners, they were
intended to reach a unanimous conclusion. This was the view taken by the
United States Attorney General. He was, however, overruled by the Secretary
26 Preamble to the Jay Treaty, reprinted in 6 MARTENs, supra note 16 at 338.
27 See also 3 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 6, at 475.
28 6 MARTENS, supra note 16, at 346.
29 Id. at 348, 354.
30 Id. at 350, 354.
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of State, after consultations with the Secretaries of the Treasury and War."
The British Foreign Secretary took a view similar to that of the United
States Secretary of State. Provided that the decision was reached in the presence
of all three Commissioners-an analogy from the voting rules under Articles VI
and VII of the Treaty-the Commission was empowered to decide, if necessary,
by majority vote. 2
In view of formal discrepancies in the wording of the commissions issued to
the original commissioners by their govern'ments-only that of the British Com-
missioner contained an express authorization to accept majority decisions-the
matter was clarified on the diplomatic level. Yet, no occasion arose when the
Commission of any majority of it asserted its rights to majority voting against
one or both Contracting Parties." The most that could be said would be that the
subsequent diplomatic exchanges between the Parties amounted to an authori-
tative interpretation of Article V of the Jay Treaty by both Parties.
B. Self-Determination of Jurisdiction
The Commission under Article V of the Jay Treaty was charged with the
task of establishing which river was intended to be the River mentioned in the
Peace Treaty of September 3, 1783 under the name of St. Croix and forming
part of the British-United States boundary in North America. The issue was to
be decided according to the evidence to be laid before the Commission by the
Contracting Parties. Thus, everything was so straightforward as to raise little
doubt on the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction.
In Article VI of the Treaty, the claims by British subjects against United
States citizens and inhabitants within the Commission's jurisdiction-or, as it
was put in the Article, "appertaining to" the Commission-had been carefully
defined. Nevertheless, disagreement on the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction
arose between the three British Commissioners-the two original members and
the third, also British and drawn by lot-and the two United States Commis-
sioners. While the British members desired to settle the issues of jurisdiction by
majority vote, the United States members claimed the right in cases which they
considered to be outside the Commission's jurisdiction to withdraw from the
Commission. They did so and, thus, brought the Commission's work to a
standstill. 4
Although Article VII on illegal seizures and captures of United States ships
by Great Britain had also been drafted with great care, the same issue arose but
with roles reversed. The three United States Commissioners-the two original
Commissioners and the fifth chosen by lot-asserted the Commission's right to
31 1 Op. ATT'y GEN. 66 (1976); I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIoNs at 752. See
also D. R. DEENER, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
337-38 (1957).
32 I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS at 10-11. Lord Grenville's (undated) Project
of Heads of Proposals and Jay's Draft of the Treaty (September 30, 1974) does not throw any
further light on the question. See S. BEmIis, JAY'S TREATY 279, 292-93 (1924).
33 I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBrrRATIONS, at 10, 751-52 n.1.
34 Id. at 290; 3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS at 2277. See also text accompany-
ing note 20 supra; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, International Court of Justice 1951-54, 34 BrT.
Y. B. INT'L 26-28 (1958).
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determine its own jurisdiction, and the two British Commissioners disagreed. 5
The way in which the Contracting Parties resolved the deadlock has already
been described. It only needs adding that on the British side, Lord Grenville,
the Foreign Secretary, and Lord Loughborough, the Lord Chancellor, showed
little patience with the scruples of the British Commissioners over the Com-
mission's right to determine its own jurisdiction. Lord Grenville instructed the
British Commissioners to decide "every question that should be brought before
them according to the conviction of their consciences."' 6 With this guidance, the
consciences of the British Commissioners operated wonderfully, and with pre-
dictable results.
7
IV. The Judicial Character of the Jay Treaty Commissions
Six tests will help in determining the judicial character of the Jay Treaty
Commissions: the professional qualifications of their members; the degree of
autonomy granted to, and exercised by, the Commissions; the rules applied by
the Commissions; the technical standards of their awards; their legal effects and;
finally, the overall structure of the Commissions.
A. Professional Qualifications
The three Commissions consisted chiefly of lawyers hith a wide cultural
background. Some of them could even claim professional distinction and notable
public records in their own countries.
Thus, Thomas Barclay of Annapolis, Nova Scotia, the British member
of the Commission under Article V of the Jay Treaty, had been a volunteer and
colonel in the British forces during the American Revolution, a former student
of John Jay and practitioner of law. David Howell, the United States member,
was a graduate of Princeton, a former Attorney General of Rhode Island and
member of the State Supreme Court of Rhode Island, and had held Chairs of
Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, and of Law at Brown University at
Providence. The elected member, Egbert Benson, also a United States citizen
and the choice of both the original Commissioners, was a relation of Barclay and
had been brought up in Barclay's family. Barclay attested to him that he was a
"gentleman of undoubted ability and integrity" and hoped that he would make
a "cool, sensible and dispassionate third Commissioner."'"
The Commission was assisted by qualified agents on both sides and provided
with technical assistance from surveyors and astronomers. 9
35 I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 324; 3 MOORE, INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 2277.
36 I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 327-28.
37 While the United States lump sum payment to Great Britain for British claims before
the dissolved Commission under Article VI of the Jay Treaty, agreed on in the Convention of
January 8, 1802, amounted to U.S. Dollars 2,664,000 (I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TIONS, supra note 13, at 298), that paid for United States claims settled by the Commission
under Article VII amount to U.S. Dollars 11,650,000. Id. at 343-44. See also S. BEmrs, A
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITES STATES 110 (1936).
38 I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 6-14.
39 Id. at 8.
[Vol. 53:715]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The most distinguished member of the Commission under Article VI of the
Treaty was one of the United States Commissioners: Colonel James, a personal
friend of President Washington and former Attorney General of Virginia. On his
death in 1798, he was replaced by Samuel Sitgreaves, another well-known lawyer
and public figure." In the opinion of the then United States Secretary of State,
Thomas Macdonald, one of the original British Commissioners so much domi-
nated the other two British Commissioners-Henry Pye Rich and John Guil-
lemard, the fifth member chosen by lot-that he virtually had three votes at his
disposal. The United States Secretary of State also noted with disapproval that,
as he had been informed, the fifth Commissioner behaved in the Commission
with less aloofness from the government-appointed Commissioners than might
have been expected from an "umpire": "He had entered into the private de-
liberations of the two British Commissioners and come to the board with all the
decisive prepossessions which such private, partial consultations were calculated
to produce."'"
The Commission under Article VII of the Treaty had as one of its two
original members on the British side John Nicholl, a specialist in Admiralty Law
(when he accepted the post of King's Advocate before the High Court of Ad-
miralty, he was replaced by another civilian) and two eminent United States
lawyers, Christopher Gore and William Pinkney. The most colorful member of
the Commission was Colonel Trumbull, a United States citizen who had been
drawn by lot as the fifth Commissioner. He had been Jay's Secretary in the
negotiations on the 1794 Treaty and, subsequently, was primarily remembered
as a painter of historical pictures. 2
Compared with the professional qualifications of members of subsequent
mixed commissions and other tribunals, those of the remaining members of the
Jay Treaty Commissions were perhaps less orthodox but hardly inferior.
B. Autonomy
The standards laid down for the Commissioners in their oaths or declara-
tions offered some indirect protection to the Commissioners against unwarranted
interference with their autonomy by either of the Parties.
As implied in Articles V-VII of the Jay Treaty, each of the Parties replaced
unilaterally one of its Commissioners, the United States because of the death of
one of its original Commissioners, and Great Britain because of a Commissioner's
appointment to governmental office. The United States did not take any ob-
jection to the withdrawal and replacement of this British Commissioner from the
Commission under Article VII. It probably considered it as understood that
each Party was free to replace, for any reason, any of its original Commissioners.
It is questionable whether, without concurrence of the other Party, with-
40 Id. at 398.
41 Id. at 295.
42 Including a portrait of John Jay in City Hall, New York. On the attempts made by
the original commissioners to reduce the disadvantages arising from choosing the fifth commis-
sioner by way of lottery, see I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 320.
See also J. TRUMBULL, REMINISCENCES OF HIS TIME (1841).
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drawals due to acts of one of the Parties-as, for instance, the offer of another
post-are compatible with the jus aequum character of clauses such as Articles
V-VII of the Jay Treaty.
It is arguable that, in the case of commissions such as those under Articles
VI and VII of the Jay Treaty in which one of the original members from each
side and the fifth member remain available,43 fewer objections arise than in the
case of a commission such as that under Article V when, in accordance with the
governing treaty, each member is indispensable for the proper functioning of a
commission.
In all cases, difficulties arising in a jus aequum nexus can be decided, in the
last resort, only in the light of all the circumstances of the individual case. Thus,
the substitution of one nominated commissioner by another may, or may not, be
compatible with the obligations of a contracting party. If acts of sharp practice
were thought to be compatible with the obligations of contracting parties, the
door would be opened wide for acts which, without involving bad faith, might
fall just short of clearly illegal behavior. Yet, such action might lead to, for
instance, unnecessary delays if an experienced commissioner were appointed to a
post which would dictate his resignation from the commission.
The workload of the Commission under Article VII of the Jay Treaty il-
lustrates the problems that might have been caused by unnecessary substitutions.
When, after three years of the Commission's work, its proceedings were sus-
pended, over four hundred claims were pending before it.4" In commissions of
this type, the swift disposal of the bulk of cases depends on the preliminary
classification of all cases under prototypes, considered in detail by the commis-
sioners. Continuity is preserved either by identity of membership or acceptance
by successors of the judicial policies laid down by their predecessors.
In the political environment of the Jay Treaty Arbitrations, nothing was
further from the minds of the two Governments than to interfere with the
autonomy of any of the Commissions. With the exception of the retaliatory
withdrawal of the British Commissioners from the Commission under Article
VII, both Governments issued instructions only on rare occasions. Even so, this
only happened when some of their own Commissioners took up positions which
their governments considered to be too extreme representations of supposed or
actual national interests of their countries, and the governments were concerned
that their own Commissioners might jeopardize overriding common or parallel
interests.
C. Rules Applied
The Jay Treaty was reasonably explicit in the formulation of the rules
which each of the three Commissions was to apply.
In the case of the Commission under Article V of the Treaty, establishment
of the "truly intended" identity of the River St. Croix necessarily involved in-
43 For a short period, the Commission under Article VII had to operate in such condi-
tions. I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, suprt note 13, at 320.
44 Id. at 342.
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terpretation of the Peace Treaty of September 3, 1783 between the Parties. The
Commissioners were charged to base their identification of the River on the
evidence laid by the Parties before the Commission. Thus, the extent to which
the Commission had to apply international law was negligible. Its major task
was to apply common sense and find an accommodation between the Parties
which did justice to the double jus aequum nexus created by the 1783 and 1794
Treaties."5
Similarly, the claims before the Commission under Article VI of the Treaty
had only an indirect connection with international law. They related to private
debts to British nationals, incurred by United States citizens and inhabitants
prior to the 1783 Peace Treaty, and, in principle, were subject to municipal
law. International law was relevant only in setting limits under Article VI of the
Treaty to the application of this municipal law and providing overriding criteria
of "justice and equity."4
It was only the Commission under Article VII of the Treaty which was
concerned with issues arising directly from international law: allegedly illegal
seizures and captures, prior to the ratification of the Jay Treaty, of United States
ships and property by Great Britain in the war then being waged by Great
Britain and her Continental allies against revolutionary France. These cases were
to be decided in accordance with "justice, equity, and the law of nations."47
In all cases, the primary emphasis was on the express provisions of the
Treaty, and the equity elements introduced by the Treaty served to ease the task
of making final settlements of the disputes submitted to the Commissions. By
and large, the rules of decision provided strengthen the case in favor of the Com-
missions' judicial character.
D. Quality of the Awards
The quality of the awards rendered by the Commissions under Articles V
and VII of the Jay Treaty is impressive. As the Commission under Article VI
was dissolved before it could deal with the bulk of the cases before it, its profes-
sional standards can be assessed best by the quality of the terms in which ma-
jority and minority members expressed their disagreements." These maneuvers
can vie with the most sophisticated of lawyers' stalling techniques.
To do justice to the joint Declaration made by the three Commissioners
under Article V, it is necessary to supplement study of the text of the Declaration
by that of the Report,4" submitted to the President of the United States by
Egbert Benson, the United States member selected by agreement between the
original Commissioners. It then emerges that the Declaration was as sensible an
45 For the 1783 Peace Treaty, see II MARTENS, supra note 16, at 497; HILL, supra note
7, at 22. On the unavoidable element of compromise in the judicial settlement of border dis-
putes, see II MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 13, at 367-68.
46 II MARTENS, supra note 15, at 350. On Jay's explanatory letter to his Government on
these equity clauses, see I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 275. See
also BEMIS, supra note 32, at 315 et seq.
47 II MARTENS, supra note 16, at 354.
48 I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 280. See also Lillich, supra
note 7, at 272-74.
49 I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 33.
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accommodation as, with scanty evidence and in trying physical conditions im-
posed by the largely unexplored character of part of the area in dispute, could be
expected from any frontiers commission.
It was the work of the Commission under Article VII of the Jay Treaty
which produced the Commissions' most remarkable contributions to substantive
international law on major issues such as necessity"° and maritime neutrality.5 '
Similarly, the Opinions filed in the cases of The Betsey and Sally (1798) by the
United States Commissioners Gore and Pinkney on the Commission's right to
determine its own jurisdiction and deal with cases pending in British prize
courts52 have provided leading cases on these central issues of International
Judicial Law.
Moreover, the unchallenged reliance of both Commissioners on natural-law
arguments and the authority of Grotius, Sir Leoline Jenkins, Pufendorf and
Vattel illustrate how, on a basis of tacit consent, ethical postulates can be trans-
formed legitimately into experimentally applied rules of international jus
aequum.
These Opinions have stood the test of time. They are what Wheaton praised
when speaking of the work of one of the United States Commissioners as
"finished models of judicial eloquence, uniting powerful and comprehensive
argument with a copious, pure and energetic diction,"s 3a judgment with which
John Bassett Moore associated himself.54
E. Legal Effects of the Awards
In relation to each of the three Commissions, the Parties to the Jay Treaty
made it clear that they intended the awards of these Commissions to be final and
binding decisions on the underlying disputes.
In the words of Article V of the Treaty, "both Parties agree to consider
such decision as final and conclusive, so that the same shall never thereafter
be called into question, or made the subject of dispute or difference between
them."55
Like the professional standards attained in the awards, the legal effects con-
templated by the Parties are characteristic of those normally associated with
arbitration. They further strengthen the case for the classification of the Com-
missions under the Jay Treaty as judicial international institutions.
50 See I SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 6, at 641.
51 See II SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 6, at XXXI-XXXII, for a Table of Cases under
Jay Treaty Arbitrations.
52 III MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 2278, 2305.
53 C. PINKNEY, LIFE OF PINKNEY 26 (1895). See also S. BEMIS, PINKNEY's TREATY:
A STUDY OF AMERICA'S ADVANTAGE FROM EUROPE'S DISTRESS, 1783-1800 (1960).
It would be mistaken to underestimate the quality of Commissioner Trumbull's Opinions.
See, e.g., IV MOORE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 3993, 4001.
For the reasons why Jay has chosen Trumbull as Secretary of the United States Mission
for the negotiation of the 1794 Treaty, see F. MONAGHAN, JOHN JAY 369 (1935).
54 I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 319-20.





Given contracting parties who, as happened in the case of the Jay Treaty
Arbitrations, put observance of their commitments above everything else, the
structure of international judicial organs appears to affect less than may be
expected the attainment of the parties' overriding object: final disposal of the
disputes entrusted to the international organs concerned. Yet, even in such
optimal conditions, their structure can enhance or detract from the judicial
character of such organs.
If a bipartite organ consists of an equal number of representatives, without
express provision for the election or co-option of one or more additional mem-
bers but with guidance on the rules to be applied similar to that given in the
Jay Treaty, it may have every intention of complying with the directions of the
contracting parties. Yet, they may find that, on other than clear-cut issues (and,
on the facts or the applicable rules of law and equity, not many issues are in this
category), the members of such a bipartite organ will find it difficult to reach
agreement. If, as with members comparable to those of the Jay Treaty Com-
missions, they have a common background of civilization, moral values, and
approaches to law, their disagreements may be of a purely personal character.
Yet, this may be an illusion, or the members may hide from others, if not them-
selves, divisive considerations of a metalegal character. Undisclosed major
premises, especially views on actual or imagined national interests or other
ideological commitments may guide the choice of undisclosed major premises
and, consequently, of applicable legal rules or equitable preferences.
On the hypothesis made of an equal number of members, every majority
decision would depend on at least one member chosen by one side being per-
suaded of the better case of the other side. It may be that the member who tilts
the balance makes his decision on grounds he professes and, in the history of
international judicial institutions, this has happened."6 Yet, the disagreement
on major issues in the Jay Treaty Arbitrations-voting rules and self-determina-
tion of jurisdiction-hardly recommends such an assumption as a general
hypothesis.
The explanation which appears most consistent with the attitudes actually
adopted by the members of the Commissions under Articles VI and VII of the
Jay Treaty is that their legal preferences on each of two major issues of Inter-
national Judicial Law were determined by their conscious or subconscious views
on the national interests of their own countries.
In the cases of the Commissions under Articles VI and VII of the Jay
Treaty, the attitudes of the original Commissioners were hardened by the knowl-
edge that, with fifth Commissioners of their own nationality, they were defending
majority positions. Neither the majority in the Commission under Article VI (the
British Commissioners) nor that in the Commission under Article VII (the
United States Commissioners) was prepared to jeopardize these advantages
without governmental instruction.
56 See, e.g., BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 281 (1953).
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If an even number of members had been left to their own devices, they
would have had to confess failure or, whatever rules might have been prescribed
in the governing treaty, the actual settlement would have involved an element
of compromise sufficient to carry all or a majority of the commissioners. It is
reasonably clear that this was what happened before all three Commissioners
under Article V of the Jay Treaty signed and sealed their joint Declaration as
bidden by the Treaty.
If, as under Articles VI and VII of the Jay Treaty, the original Commis-
sioners are to elect the fifth member, and they limit their choice to candidates
of their own nationalities-as they did, without being obliged to do so by the
Treaty-they have taken a decisive step towards pre-empting decision of the
adjective and substantive issues yet to be considered by their fully established
commissions. Making every allowance for the honorable intentions of all con-
cerned, such scepticism is confirmed by the evidence of how, subsequently, with
reversed roles, the majorities of both Commissions under Articles VI and VII
of the Jay Treaty dealt with the issue of self-determination of their jurisdiction.
Even if the Commissioners under the Jay Treaty had been unaware of the
implications of their actions-and the more they acted in a spirit of complete
oblivion to these metalegal factors, the more convincingly they would have ful-
filled their appointed functions-their governments had anticipated the con-
tingency of ties between an even number of commissioners. This is why they had
provided that if the Commissioners should fail to agree on the fifth members in
the Commissions under Articles VI and VII of the Treaty, these should be chosen
by lot.
The Parties could hardly have indicated more clearly that choice by lottery
was the lesser evil compared with the overriding object of settling these disputes
and maintaining peace between the two States in the midst of a major war. As
it happened, at least as far as the honors and appearances, if not the balance of
actual payments, were concerned, "Goddess Fortuna" distributed the odds
equally in presenting one umpire to each of the Parties.
As previously explained, contracting parties have considerable discretion
in replacing nominated members of mixed commissions. If to such situations
others are added in which the parties are entitled to withdraw commissioners by
way of reprisal or issue instructions to their commissioners, or commissioners
consider themselves entitled to advise their governments--as did the United
States Commissioners in the Commission under Article VII of the Jay Treaty
on the most effective way in which claims should be submitted"--such action,
proper as it may be, cannot help but detract from the independence or self-
isolation from extraneous quarters which, on principle, is desirable even for part-
time and ad hoc judicial officers.
In individual cases, it may be true that members of mixed commissions
may consider themselves international judges as Commissioner Gore stated in
his individual Opinion in the Betsey case, filed during the suspension of the
Commission under Article VII of the Jay Treaty. He declared his sense of
"equal obligations of duty to both nations: Although I am a citizen of but one,
57 I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 329.
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I am constituted a Judge for both. Each nation has the same, and no greater,
right to demand of me fidelity and diligence in the examination, exactness and
justice of the Decision.""8
The structural shortcomings of commissions of the Jay Treaty type counsel
caution regarding the classification without qualifications of these commissions
as international judicial institutions. Yet, in the case of the Jay Treaty Arbitra-
tions, the willingness of the Contracting Parties to assist in overcoming any
difficulties that arose and the standards maintained by the Commissioners them-
selves appear to carry greater weight.
It may well be that then, or subsequently, the constructive attitude shown by
the Parties in the Jay Treaty Arbitrations was atypical. Yet, whenever good faith
is in short supply, even more sophisticated institutional guarantees of judicial
immunity and self-isolation of the judicial element can offer but limited protec-
tion against pressures from outside and self-coordination inside international
judicial institutions.
V. The Post-1898 Tradition Re-examined
In the post-1898 tradition in the Doctrine of international law, outlined in
the previous Section,5" the Jay Treaty Arbitrations established the right-and
duty-of international judicial institutions to make decisions by majority vote,
determine their own jurisdiction, and settle disputes submitted to them on the
basis of international law. To avoid being misleading, however, each of these
apparently simple propositions requires qualification.
A. Voting
It remains a moot point whether the Contracting Parties ever intended the
Commission under Article V of the Jay Treaty to make decisions by majority
vote. As the Commission was able, if with difficulties, to reach a unanimous de-
cision, it appears impossible to reach any firm conclusion either way.
Insofar as the Commissions under Articles VI and VII of the Treaty are
concerned, the limited forms of majority voting applied rested on express treaty
authorization. Thus, it would require considerable subsequent evidence to
establish, in the absence of express treaty provisions to the contrary, a presump-
tion in favor of majority voting in international judicial institutions."
B. Self-Determination of Jurisdiction
All the Jay Treaty Arbitrations settled on this point was that-in the one
case British and, in the other, American-majorities in each of the Commissions
58 Id. at 2288, vol. III.
59 Id. at Section I.
60 For some time, it has probably been possible to presume that the relevant provisions of
Hague Conventions I of 1899 and 1907 (Articles 51 and 78, reprinted in J. ScoTT, Tu- HAOuE
CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at 73 (1915)) and Articles 55 (1) of
the Statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of
Justice which represented the typical intentions of parties to international adjudications.
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under Articles VI and VII asserted, and the minorities disputed, the right of
their Commission to determine its own jurisdiction.
As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice pointed out,6 the rule of self-determination of
jurisdiction can be challenged on two grounds: its incompatibility with the
Nemo judex in sua causa maxim and with the principle of consent as the basis
of the jurisdiction of international judicial institutions.
In view of the limited and purely consensual reception of the Nemo judex
maxim into international law, 2 the first doubt reduces itself to a matter of
interpreting the overriding intention of contracting parties. Similarly, in the
absence of express provision to the contrary, it would require a generally accepted
practice of assertion by judicial international institutions of the power to deter-
mine their own jurisdiction before the grant of such authority could be con-
sidered as having been implied by contracting parties.63
All that can be stated on this matter in relation to the Jay Treaty Arbitra-
tions themselves is that, in very special circumstances, two particular contracting
parties preferred the one surviving Commission (under Article VII) not to
refer the issues before them back to their constituent governments, but to settle
the disputes submitted to the Commission. In the case of the Commission under
Article VI, as a result of the discord between the Commissioners on the issue of
self-determination of jurisdiction, the two Governments found it simpler than
reconvening the Commission to settle the issues before the suspended Commis-
sion by diplomatic negotiation and treaty.
C. The Rules Applied by the Commissions
On the rules applied by the three Commissions, it will suffice to summarize
here the results of the examination made in the preceding Section:
(1) In a formal sense, all three Commissions under the Jay Treaty applied
international law; for they had to interpret the Articles of the Treaty under
which they were operating.
(2) In the cases of the Commissions under Articles V and VI, the applica-
tion of international law was merely nominal.
(3) In that of the Commission under Article VII, the work involved the
formulation and application of important rules of the law of maritime neutrality.
(4) Equitable considerations influenced in different ways the findings of
each of the three Commissions:
(a) The Commission under Article V applied equity in the sense that it
had to determine the disputed frontier under investigation in a spirit of
accommodation and common sense.
(b) The Commission under Article VI was expressly authorized to apply
considerations of justice and equity so as to override incompatible
rules of otherwise applicable municipal law.
61 Fitzmaurice, supra note 34, at 26-28.
62 See also III SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 6, at 64.
63 See text accompanying note 60 supra, for a similar position. See atso Article 43 of
Hague Convention I of 1899 and Article 73 of Hague Convention I of 1907, reprinted in
ScoTT, supra note 60, at 72, and Article 36 (6), Statutes P.C.I.J. and I.C.J.
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(c) The Commission under Article VII employed the ambiguous juxta-
position of equity and law of nations in Article VII so as to infuse
reasonable doses of jus aequum into the rules of international law it
chose to apply.
VI. Present-Day kelevance of the Jay Treaty Arbitrations
The present-day significance of the Jay Treaty Arbitrations will be discussed
under five heads: a new beginning, limitations of the arbitration clauses, the
overriding common interest, loopholes, and unstated major premises.
A. A New Beginning?
The initiative in proposing commissions for the settlement of the issues
covered in the end by Articles V-VII of the Jay Treaty came from John Jay, but
Lord Grenville also took an active part in this work, especially in drafting Article
VII. 4 The reasons for Jay's initiative were mixed but he received a sympathetic
response in London. The primary reason for Jay's proposal was the formidable
list of unsolved controversies between the two countries.65 There was a common
desire on the part of both nations to reach a settlement of, at least, the most
inflammable issues without undue delay. 6 The second was to disembarrass the
two Governments of the thorny questions involved and to leave their settlement
to the "law," because of the hostility of public opinion to the Treaty in the
United States.67
It is not necessary to search far for how Jay rediscovered the "egg" of
Columbus. From the authorities quoted by the United States Commissioners in
the Jay Treaty Arbitrations,"8 it is evident that United States lawyers concerned
with international law, like their British counterparts-from the same sources
64 Compare Jay's draft of September 30, 1794, with the final version in the convenient
presentation by BEhns, supra note 32, at 292. See also I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TIONS, supra note 13, at 5, 309.
On the relevance of Jay's earlier studies of international law, his experience as Chief Clerk
to the Royal Commission for determining the disputed boundaries between New York and
New Jersey (1769-1776), and the proposals of 1782 and those contained in his Report of April
21, 1785, to Congress for a mixed commission to settle the eastern frontier with Great Britain,
see THE AMERICAN SECRETARIES OF STATE AND THEIR DIPLOMACY 194-95, 203-05, 283 (S.
Bemis ed. 1927) and MONAGHAN, supra note 53, at 41, 205, 271.
While Articles V-VII of the 1794 Treaty are Jay's original contribution, the preliminary
negotiations had been conducted largely by Alexander Hamilton and George Hammond, the
British minister to the United States. See BEmiS, supra note 53, at 283.
J. Newcomb, New Light on Jay's Treaty, 28 A.J.I.L. 685 (1934), is chiefly concerned
with relevant British Orders in Council on the seizure of contraband, but not with the issues
covered in this paper.
65 See the list in II F. WHARTON, A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 161-62 (1886); and V. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 704-05
(1906) [hereinafter cited as MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW].
66 Thus, it was agreed in Article XXVIII of the Jay Treaty that "other Articles be pro-
posed and added to this Treaty, which Articles, from want of time and other circumstances,
cannot now be perfected." See MILLER, supra note 16, at 384.
67 See, e.g., 1. Clapham in I Sir A. Ward & G. Gooch, THE 'CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 156 (1922); BEMIS, supra note 53, at ch. XIX; V. MOORE, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 65, at 701-02.
68 See text accompanying Section 4 supra and, for instance, GROTuS, II Ds JJRE BELLI
AC PAGIS Ch. XXIII, VIII (1625); PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM Ch. XIII
(1688); and II VATTEL, LE DRorr DES GENS Ch. XVIII, Para. 329 (1758).
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and, possibly, earlier English and British treaty practice69 -were fully conversant
with the device of arbitration and its functions, as one of the four types of
measures taken via amicabili, the others being negotiation, conference and
congress.
7 0
For purposes of a typology of the forms of international judicial institu-
tions,71 some novelty may be thought to attach to the variants of judicial institu-
tion incorporated in the Jay Treaty. In a subsequent phase of the development
of the doctrine of international law, some of its representatives would also desire
to emphasize the novelty of reviving this type of machinery after a considerable
break in its use, and the frequency with which, for over a century, such commis-
sions were to be employed. Yet, from an inter-disciplinary angle, these breaks in
continuity and revivals appear less significant than the continuity in function:
resort to arbitration in comparable constellations of international power politics
and, in the case of the Jay Treaty Arbitrations, for even more typical and im-
mediate purposes of power tactics.
The problem for Great Britain was how to detach the United States from
revolutionary France, and the Jay Treaty more than fulfilled British expectations.
It led to a partial break in diplomatic relations between France and the United
States. 7 2
Similarly, the problem for the United States was to avoid becoming a
junior partner of either of the greater Powers involved in the war then being
waged between France and Great Britain and supported by most Continental
Powers. The Jay Treaty greatly assisted President Washington's policy of strict
neutrality between the belligerents as the best way of achieving this national
objective."3
69 In Lord Grenville's Project of Heads of Proposals, provision was made for a Commission
to deal with complaints regarding the execution of what subsequently became Article VI of
the Jay Treaty (see Section 4 infra) : "Two Commissaries" to be appointed by each side, with
power to call to their assistance, as "Joint Commissaries," one or three more persons, of any
"Indifferent Nation or Nations." BEMsS, supra note 32, at 280.
On the use of mixed commissions in earlier English and British practice, see, e.g., Article
XXX of the Peace Treaty of April 5, 1654 between the Commonwealth and the United Prov-
inces of the Netherlands (III COLLECTION OF TREATIES 78 (1732)), and Articles X and XI
of the Peace Treaty of Utrecht of March 31/April 11, 1713, on, among other matters, the
delimitation of the Franco-British frontier in the areas of the Hudson Bay and Straits by Com-
missioners to be named by each of the Parties. Id. at 431-32.
70 See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 68; I PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL
LAw 11 (1879).
71 The model of the Commissions under Articles VI and VII of the Jay Treaty bears some
similarity to that of the Commission under Article XXX of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1654.
See note 69 supra.
If the Commissioners, on each side, were unable to agree, the issues before the Commis-
sion were to be decided by Commissioners to be appointed by the Protestant Swiss Cantons, and
the decisions of these Commissioners, or a majority of them, was to be binding on both Parties.
Id. at 78-79.
Actually, the Anglo-Dutch Commission under Article XXX was able to reach agreement
without recourse to the Protestant Swiss Cantons. For the text of the Award (termed Regula-
tion) of August 30, 1654, see V. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at
4838.
72 See, e.g., W. PHILLIPS & A. REEDE, NEUTRALITY: THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD 73 (1936);
R. VAN ALSTYNE, AMERICAN DIPLOMsACY IN ACTION 488-89, 687-89 (1947).
73 See, e.g., R. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 72, at 687.
See also letter of September 5, 1793, from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Hammond, annexed to
the Treaty, reprinted in MARTENS, supra note 16, at 386; CHr. THOMAS, AMERICAN NEu-
TRALITY IN 1793 (1931).
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In the equilibrium established by the Jay Treaty, Great Britain fared better
than the United States. The latter had to content itself with fewer issues being
settled than it might have wished. This was due to the greater interest shown
by the United States in reaching an agreement and well-informed British Intel-
ligence on the terms which, if necessary, the United States negotiators were pre-
pared to accept.7 4
B. Limitations of the Arbitration Clauses
In any assessment of the Jay Treaty, it is necessary to recall that this was
not a treaty for the promotion of peace in general but for an accommodation
between two particular States, one a belligerent greater Power involved in a
major war, and the other an untried and small would-be neutral State. More-
over, the arbitration provisions were limited to three specific types of past dis-
putes and did not cover any future disputes on maritime neutrality beyond the
date of the ratification of the Treaty.7
C. The Overriding Common Interest
Both Contracting Parties considered the maintenance of peace between
them on the basis of the equilibrium established by the 1783 and 1794 Treaties
as more important than any of the issues entrusted to the three Commissions.
This overriding objective was symbolized by their willingness, if necessary, to
leave to chance the choice of the uneven commissioner in each Commission.
Their joint resolve found further expression in the effective settlement by dip-
lomatic means of the difficulties in which any of the Commissions landed itself.
D. Loopholes
In the historical circumstances surrounding the Jay Treaty and its ap-
plication, both Parties had every reason to practice the maximum of good faith.
Yet, in cases in which parties were less anxious to apply the arbitration model
provided by the Jay Treaty, the Treaty would have offered four major loop-
holes:
(1) Contracting parties would have been able to withdraw commissioners
they had appointed on grounds such as those advanced by the minorities
on self-determination of a commission's jurisdiction and voting pro-
cedures or because of, for instance, political appointments offered to
commissioners.
(2) Contracting parties would have been free to leave it to the commis-
74 For the list of nineteen desiderata, see Jay's official instructions. BEMis, supra note 32,
at 213.
Id. at 251, 269; BEMIS, supra note 37, at 101.
See also V. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 65, at 701-06.
75 This point is rightly emphasized by J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLicT 76 n.11 (1949).
On the then relatively minor character of the River St. Croix issue, see BEMis, supra note
64, at 332, n.17.
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sioners to spin out controversies over jurisdiction, procedure and voting
rights and, until the solution of such disagreements, refuse to deal with
the substantive issues submitted to their commission.
(3) Contracting parties would have been free, as happened even in the
exceptionally favourable circumstances of the Jay Treaty Commissions,
to withdraw-temporarily or finally-their appointed commissioners
by way of reprisal.
(4) Contracting parties would have been free to treat any obvious excess
of jurisdiction by a commission as a ground for treating awards so
vitiated as null and void.
76
E. Unstated Major Premises
Finally, and this gives to the Jay Treaty Arbitrations truly a claim to be
regarded as a historical landmark, the study of these Arbitrations poses with
classic simplicity and in a readily verifiable form central issues of International
Judicial Law. They arise from the striking coincidences between majority and
minority reasonings in the Commissions under Articles VI and VII of the Jay
Treaty and narrowly conceived national interests on the issues before the two
Commissions.
Growing awareness of the choices open regarding applicable rules in any
rudimentary system of international law would soon lead to a powerful, if but
moderately successful, movement for the codification of international law. Yet,
that it was possible to argue questions of adjective international law such as
jurisdiction, voting, or procedure from undisclosed major premises and, thus,
avoid or, possibly, pre-empt the substantive decisions to be made was perhaps
never before demonstrated so vividly.
What was even more disturbing was that this should have happened in
optimal conditions of international adjudication: between governments of
countries linked by common legal, cultural and ethnic traditions, in a liberal age,
with arbitrators well-qualified for their task and accepted by both sides as men
of the highest moral integrity, and in an atmosphere of few, if any, pressures on
the members of the commissions.
If any or all of these optimal conditions were not fulfilled, how international
adjudication would fare was the crucial question posed, and left unanswered, by
the Jay Treaty Arbitrations.
76 See the Order of April 18, 1798, issued by the Commission under Article VI of the
Jay Treaty. I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS, supra note 13, at 281.
See also VATTEL, supra note 68, at 329.
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